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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 outbreak has lead to unprecedented crisis all over the world. Because vaccines or
widespread high-quality testing are not yet available, social distancing is the main tool to fight
the spread of the virus, and hence, face-to-face classes and examinations have been interrupted.
This is important especially in cases in which standardized test scores are used to allocate
scarce resources, namely students to college, or to scholarships. What can policy-makers do in
the absence of such information?
The main alternatives to be considered are either to postpone the exam, to use alternative
methods to define admissions or to use a predictive model to assign grades on the high-stakes
exam using historical data. If the exam is postponed it still may require some adjustments. In
Spain, for instance, exams were postponed and in autonomous communities such as Catalonia,
they adapted its format to ensure that all students had questions which they could answer
given what they had covered in school.1 In the UK, a predictive model was used for secondary
school examinations. Likewise, the International Baccalaureate announced by the end of March
that exams were cancelled and that a predictive model would be used to assign scores. The
aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences of cancelling high-stakes exams in a given
year and predicting them by using high school grades and information about the school and
track attended. We outline the promises and pitfalls of different methods and empirically assess
them.
There are two alternative policies that would be important to study: using a predictive
model to replace a high-stakes exam, or running anyway the high-stakes exam after a period
of prolonged school disruption. Ideally, we would like to compare the outcomes of each policy
with the counterfactual outcomes in a normal year without the COVID-19 outbreak and the
subsequent school disruption. This would allow us to empirically assess which policy ensures
that test scores are closer to the counterfactual. This paper mainly focuses on studying the
effect of the first policy - using a predictive model to replace a high-stakes exam. We use data
from past cohorts of high school graduates in the Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia,
leveraging information on both their high school grades and their test scores in the high-stakes
1Normally, students are given the option to pick between version A and B of the exam, but this year even
for a specific version, individuals were allowed to pick four out of the six problems to answer.
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exams to access college. We estimate various models using the first cohorts of students in the
sample, and test how well they can predict the high-stakes exams of the last cohort of students.
To the extent that the relationship between high school grades and high-stakes exams is stable
over time, this exercise allows us to quantify the effects of using predicted scores to allocate
students to college or other opportunities when it is not possible or desirable to run high-
stakes exam. While we cannot directly test the second policy - running anyway the high-stakes
exam after a period of prolonged school disruption-, in the last part of the paper we perform
simulations to explore the consequences of shocks to performance in the high-stakes exams for
college allocation.2
We estimate different predictive models for college admission scores, mainly based on high
school grades and school characteristics. Our aim is to implement models that combine trans-
parency and fairness with predictive power. This is important because although in principle
we are not interested in estimating the parameters of the prediction model -we would just care
about the out-of-sample predictive power-, models that make clear the way the information is
processed will have a much broader appeal for policymakers. We then use information on in-
dividual level characteristics to understand how different prediction models may harm or favor
different subgroups in the population.
In many countries, comprehensive standardized tests are used to select students along with
measures of continuous assessment such as high school grades or GPA. In Catalonia, the allo-
cation of students to majors and college is centralized and solely based on an admission score
that combines high school GPA with high-stakes standardizes exams, the so-called Selectivitat.3
We collected detailed administrative data on high school and high-stakes exams perfor-
mance, together with information on socio-demographic characteristics, for the universe of
students who graduate from public high schools in Catalonia in 2010-2012. In particular, we
use data on college applicants for 2010 and 2011, estimate a model to predict Selectivitat scores,
2Hopefully further access to data in the near future shall allow us to properly study this question. However,
it is noteworthy that this task will not be easy, because most countries either did not run high-stakes exams or
implemented a different exam, making the comparison with past outcomes challenging.
3Other examples of national exams include the Bagrut (Israel), the SAT (US), the Abitur (Germany), the
Baccalaureat (France), the Maturità (Italy), or A-levels (UK). In Spain, college admission is fully regulated:
colleges have no say in determining the final assignment. Hence, college admissions are similar to a school choice
problem. Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance is used, where priority for each degree is defined by a weighted
average of the Selectivitat results, giving higher weight to subjects that are more relevant for the particular
degree.
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and study what would have happened in 2012 if high-stakes exams had been cancelled and a
prediction model had been used to input Selectivitat scores instead.
There are two main takeaways from our results. The first is that high-stakes exams are
mainly explained by high school grades. The predictive accuracy of the model slightly improves
when school effects are added, but the change is not large. Even adding gender or family
background as predictors, which would not be politically implementable, does not substantially
improve the predictions’ accuracy. Results are similar using either linear models or machine
learning techniques. Our preferred specification, which includes high school grades, track and
school fixed effects, performs as well as linear regressions with a higher number of controls, or
a random forest, which allows for a rich number of implicit interactions between variables. We
also study how prediction accuracy differs across demographic groups. In our data, as in many
other settings, female and low socio-economic status (SES) students tend to do worse in high-
stakes exams than in high school grades. Given that gender or SES indicators are not included
in the prediction models, using predicted scores for college admission may favor them. Adding
school effects to the prediction reduces the prediction accuracy differences across students of
different SES groups, but it does not affect the one for females.
The second important lesson is that the unexplained variation is very large: errors made in
predicting correspond to half of the variance in high-stakes exams.4 Given that colleges have
capacity constraints and students’ rank ultimately determine college admissions, we also study
differences between students’ rank as implied by the predicted scores and their actual rank. On
average, the predicted and the observed rank differ by almost 17 percentiles.
Standardized exams are usually thought of as an objective measure of capabilities. Our
results suggest either that high-stakes exams measure some aspect about individuals that high
school grades and other school characteristics do not, or that they are a very noise measure of
these same characteristics. For instance, different schools may have different grading standards
and so it seems appropriate to somehow correct for grading standards when defining college
admissions. We have run specifications where school effects, peer quality and a rich set of
controls are included. But still, prediction errors remain very large. There is, to the best
of our knowledge, no study that directly studies the predictive power of high-stakes exams
4Exams and grades are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The out of sample mean
absolute error of our preferred specification is 0.55 s.d. (the root mean squared error id 0.7)
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on future outcomes, given that a particular college is attained. High-stakes exams correlate
with future outcomes because they greatly affect college admissions, but less is known about
its relationship with future outcomes beyond, almost mechanically, college admissions.5 This
is important in order to understand the impact of using predicted scores on the efficiency of
the resulting college assignment. On the basis of the available evidence, we can only conclude
that the most accurate prediction model that is transparent is an OLS model with a small
set of predictors, and it would deliver rather inaccurate predictions. Predictions would on
average favor some subgroups, in particular females, who otherwise do relatively worse in high-
stakes exams, compared to their performance in high school. Further research should aim at
understanding whether this prediction error captures a latent ability that no other measure
is capturing, or whether it captures irrelevant noise that distorts optimal matching in college
admissions.
Section 2 includes the data description and summary statistics. Section 3 presents the main
specifications used to train the prediction model and the in-sample and out-of-sample goodness
of fit results. Section 4 discusses the goodness-of-fit analysis for different subgroups of the
population. Section 5 presents the results of alternative prediction approaches, such as LASSO
regressions and random forest analysis. Section 6 discusses simulations to quantify the change
in ranking due to perturbation of the high-stakes exams. Section 7 concludes and discusses our
results in light of the current debate in the context of the pandemic.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Institutional Setting
In Catalonia, as in the rest of Spain, students are allocated to colleges and majors through
a centralized algorithm based solely on their entry score, which is a weighted average of high
school GPA and a comprehensive exam at the end of high school, the so-called “Selectivitat”.6
5Indirectly relating to this aspect is Ors, Palomino and Peyrache (2013), which suggests that gender differ-
ences observed in high-stakes exams do not correspond to performance in college for a set of applicants in an
elite college in France. Similarly Estevan, Gall and Morin (2020) for Brazil, analyze the impact of affirmative
action in college admissions. Affirmative action takes the form of requiring lower grades in the high-stakes exam.
They do not find that students in the subgroup benefited by the policy reform perform worse once in college.
6In this paper we focus on students who enrol in University right after completing two years of academic
upper secondary education (“Batxillerat”). A minority of students (20% of those enrolling for the first time)
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The high school GPA, in turn, averages the evaluations for all subjects undertaken in the last
two grades of secondary education. The teacher of a given subject assigns the evaluation taking
into account students performance in several tests that she administers and grades during the
year. Evaluations range from 1 to 10; the GPA is computed with up to two decimal digits, and
a 5 or more is required to graduate.
All students that sit Selectivitat have to take five written tests: (1) Catalan, (2) Spanish,
(3) Foreign Language (English, French, Italian or German), (4) History or Philosophy, and (5)
one subject specific to the high school track they attended (Science, Humanities and Social
Sciences, Arts).7 Tests are graded on a 1-10 scale, with two decimal digits, and the final score
is their average. Scoring at least 4 out of 10 is necessary to pass and be eligible to enrol in
College. Students may undertake up to two additional field-specific exams to increase their
entry score (“Selectivitat Espećıfica”). The baseline entry score for student i is given by
Entry Scorei = 0.6GPAi + 0.4SELi, (1)
and can be improved by at most 4 points taking field-specific exams. In this paper we mainly
focus on the relationship between GPA and SEL, which are common to everyone. We provide
more details on the regulation for non-compulsory exams and implement analyses that include
them in Appendix B.
College admissions here can be modelled as a one-sided matching market, where students
are allocated to capacity-constrained programs following the Deferred Acceptance algorithm,
where priorities for each of the colleges and majors are uniquely determined a major-specific
weighted average of test scores. Following Azevedo and Leshno (2016) the equilibrium in this
large market can be characterized by a set of thresholds for each program that define the
applicant with the lowest entry score. These thresholds are publicly presented together with
the final assignment.8 While the overwhelming majority of students pass Selectivitat, having a
follow a different path and enrol at an older age, either after completing tertiary vocational education (“Grau
Superior”) or after spending some years in the labor market. Their entry score is computed in a slightly different
way, while the allocation mechanism is the same.
7From 2017, only History can be chosen as (4), this change does not impact our analysis because the last
year in our data is 2012.
8Students have to choose their major before enrolling, thus a program is a major in a given University.
Before taking Selectivitat, they submit a list of preferences. Conditional on having a high enough entry score,
students can enrol in any program.
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high entry score is fundamental to have a shot at the most competitive programs.9
2.2 Data and sample selection
We use administrative data on students who graduate from a public high school in Catalonia
between 2010 and 2012, and pass Selectivitat in the same year. We exploit two main data
sources. The first one contains the universe on students applying to Catalan universities from
2010 to 2012, their entry scores, the assigned program, the high school they come from, and in-
formation on their background. In particular, we observe their gender, date of birth, postal code
of their home address, nationality, paternal and maternal education and occupation category.10
We work with the sub-sample of students who attended a public high school.11
The second data source includes the universe of students enrolled in a public high school
from school year 2009/2010 to school year 2011/2012. We observe in which track they are
enrolled (Sciences, Humanities and Social Sciences, or Arts), their end-of-the-year evaluations
and the final high school GPA for those who graduate. Moreover, we observe their gender,
date of birth, postal code and nationality. This data source was previously merged with census
and local registers to retrieve information on paternal and maternal education.12 We select the
students who graduate between 2010 and 2012 and proceed to merge the two data sources.13
We find a match for 95% of the observations in the Selectivitat data source.14 For 96.3% of
them, there exists a unique match based on high school code, year of graduation, date of birth,
gender, nationality, and postal code. An additional 0.7% of matching is retrieved exploiting
also the variables about parental education. For the remaining 3%, we perform a fuzzy merge
995% of students passed Selectivitat in Catalonia in the years of our sample.
10Education and occupation of the parents are self reported when submitting the application. We group
education levels in three categories: “low” for those who attained at most lower secondary education or voca-
tional training, “average” for upper secondary education and two years of vocational tertiary education, “high”
for college or higher qualifications. Occupation categories are “high skilled workers/managers”, “employee in
services”, “employee in other sectors”, “does not work or missing”.
11About 60% of Catalan high school students taking Selectivitat attended a public high school, while 40%
attended a private or semi-private high school. https://es.slideshare.net/coneixementcat/pau-dossier
(in Catalan)
12See Calsamiglia and Loviglio (2019) for additional details.
13We keep only observations that are uniquely identified by high school code, year of graduation, date of
birth, gender, nationality, postal code, mother education and father education. About 1.3% of observations are
dropped in both data sources; they probably are same-sex twins enrolled in the same school.
14About 75% of graduates in our sample are matched with an observations in the Selectivitat data source.
Usually, less than 80% of graduates undertake and pass Selectivitat. In fact only students who plan to enrol in
a Spanish public University have a reason to take the exam.
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that allows for discrepancy in postal code, nationality, and parental education.15 When these
variables are different, we keep the postal code in Selectivitat, the Spanish nationality, and the
highest level of education.
We infer the Selectivitat score from entry score and high school GPA, using the formula in
equation (1).16 While we do not observe separately the results for the five exams in Selectivitat,
we observe evaluations for the subject in school that are more likely to have affected performance
in the exams. To mimic the first three exams, we retrieve evaluations in the second grade of
high school for Catalan, Spanish, and the foreign language learned in school (English for 98%
of students). For the fourth exam, we take the highest evaluations at the end of second grade
between History and Philosophy. For the fifth exam, we take the average of the track-specific
subjects taught in second grade.17 When a students retake a subject twice because she repeats
second grade, we keep the most recent evaluation. For a small subset of students we could
not retrieve one or more of these variables. This issue affects less than 1% of students in 2011
and 2012, and 8% of them in 2010. In fact, in some cases retained students may be exempted
from retaking subjects that they passed the previous year. For students in the first cohort of
data, this means that we cannot observe the relevant evaluation. We standardize high school
GPA, Selectivitat, and all other evaluations to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in a given
year.18
For consistency, we run all the analyses on the subsample of students without missing
evaluations. The final sample has 31079 observations; we use the 20425 from students who
graduate in 2010 or 2011 for in-sample predictions and the 10654 observations from graduates
in 2012 for out-of-sample predictions. As a robustness check, we replicate some of the analyses
on the larger sample of 32154 observations.
15If the students moved after the enrollment in high school, the postal code in the enrollment data set may
not be updated. Students may have double nationality and report only one of them, or acquiring the Spanish
nationality when they turn 18. Information on parental education are self reported in the first data set while
they come from administrative sources in the second one, thus some discrepancy is not unexpected. To be
conservative, in the fuzzy merge we always require the education level of at least one parent to be the same.
16We drop 26 observations for which the retrieved score is smaller than 4 or larger than 10
17Usually students undertake between 3 and 5 track-specific subjects. In the final sample, only 0.8% have
less than 3 and 0.2% has more than 5.
18GPA and Selectivitat are standardized using the larger sample, to avoid deflating evaluations in 2010.
The main purpose of the standardization is to offsets small differences over time in the difficulty of Selectivitat
exams. Moreover, it makes the coefficients of the regressions easier to interpret. We replicate all the analyses
using raw evaluations and find fully aligned results.
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 plots the distributions of high school GPA (left) and Selectivitat (right). Both have
positive skewness, with a longer tail to the right, which is particularly thin for Selectivitat. In
fact, very few students obtain evaluations close to the maximum in all five tests. Having a high
GPA is relatively more common, and the density has a small pick at around +2 s.d. Moreover
the distribution of GPA is somewhat more asymmetric, with a lot of mass between -1 s.d. and
the mean, and a smaller left tail.19 In fact, most students who barely graduate from high school
choose to not pursue further academic studies and do not undertake Selectivitat.20 While the
truncation of the left tail is slightly more evident for Selectivitat, it is clear that few students
score the bare minimum to pass. This is not surprising given that mostly only those who have
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Note. Distribution of evaluations for students who graduate from 2010 to 2012 and pass Selectivitat. The
continuous black lines are kernel density plots.
Table 1 shows average GPA and Selectivitat by high school track, gender, and parental
19The local maximum in the right tail corresponds to a final GPA of 9 out of 10 in raw values. The interval
[−1, 0] corresponds approximately to raw scores from 6 to 7.
20In the sample used in this paper, only 31% of students whose high school GPA is lower than 5.5 undertake
and pass Selectividad. For comparison, 61% of students with GPA between 5.5 and 6.5 do so. The share raises
to 86% among those with a higher GPA.
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education. For each category, share in the sample is reported in the last line. In the remaining
of the paper we use parental education as main proxy for socioeconomic status (SES).21
About 46% of students in the sample attended the Humanities and Social Sciences track
(Humanities from now on), about 50% attended the Sciences track, and the remaining 4%, the
Arts track. The average GPA for students who did Sciences is almost 0.3 s.d. larger than for
those in Humanities. They also do better in Selectivitat, but the gap decreases by about 0.1 s.d.
Arts students have on average the lowest GPA, and the disadvantage is similar for Selectivitat.
We include dummies for high school tracks in some of the specifications implemented in next
Section, to account for systematic differences in the outcomes of students who come from
different tracks.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by subgroups
High School Track Gender Parental education
Arts Sciences Humanities Male Female Low Average High
GPA -0.233 0.184 -0.105 -0.092 0.123 -0.100 -0.039 0.218
(0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Selectividad -0.263 0.121 -0.064 0.028 0.016 -0.227 -0.046 0.276
(0.026) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
% in sample 3.925 50.291 45.738 40.716 59.284 24.924 40.043 34.805
Note. The table shows average high school GPA and Selectivitat by high school track, gender, and parental
education. Parental education is low if both parents have at most lower secondary education, high if one has
tertiary education and the other at least upper secondary education, average in the other cases.
Females, who account for almost 60% of the students in the sample, on average have a
GPA higher than males by 0.2 s.d. Conversely, they do not do better in Selectivitat (Azmat
et al., 2016). This rather striking difference may have several explanations. Females may do
better in tasks or subjects that are captured by the GPA but are not tested by the high-stakes
exams. Some teachers may have a positive bias for girls, or rewards non-cognitive traits (such
as good behavior in class) that perhaps are more common among females (Lavy and Sand,
2018). Females may be more likely to choke on high-stakes tests and under perform. In this
21The three categories of parental education can be thought as a “mean” of father and mother education.
Parental education is low if they both have low education, it is high if at least one is college educated and the
other graduated high school, it is average in the other cases. When one of the parents is missing, the category
of the other is used. Parental education is missing for 71 students in the sample. In Section 4, we also exploit
additional characteristics, such as parental broad category of occupation.
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paper we do not aim to provide any causal explanation about this difference in performance,
but we will discuss how using predicted scores would affect students differently depending on
their gender.
On average students with high educated parents perform substantially better than those
with low educated parents. The gap is about 0.3 s.d. for high school GPA, and it widens to
0.5 s.d. for Selectivitat. Again, various reasons may be behind this difference. On one hand,
students with low SES may be more likely to attend schools that set somewhat lower grading
standards (e.g., for some grading on the curve effects, if performance are below the average
in the population). In this case, their GPA would be somewhat inflated compared with their
Selectivitat. On the other hand, they may be less likely to receive private tutoring and specific
training for high-stakes exams. In this case high SES students may have an advantage in taking
the test that does not reflect a higher level of skills. Finally, low SES students may also be
vulnerable to high-stakes exams, for similar reasons that females do. As for gender, we will
study how predictions based on high school evaluations would affect differently students with
differing parental background.
Public schools in Catalonia vary widely in size and share of students who take Selectivitat.
In the models that require the estimation of school fixed effects, we include dummies only for
schools with at least 6 students in each of the three years in the sample, and pool together the
other schools in the baseline category. These schools are 369 out of 442, and they account for
95% of students in the sample.22
Figure 2 displays performance at the school level in two consecutive years. The left panel
plots GPA in 2012 on the y-axis and GPA in 2011 on the x-axis. The right panel do the same
for Selectivitat. In both years there is more dispersion in school average Selectivitat than in
school average GPA. For both GPA and Selectivitat, the correlation between current and past
average performance is positive and significant, but it is always below 0.5: there is clearly a lot
of yearly variation that could not be anticipated looking at average performance in the previous
year.
The correlation between average GPA and Selectivitat at the school/year level is about 0.4.
22As shown in Figure 9 in the Appendix, the number of graduates in a given year vary from 10 to more than
100, with most schools between 20 and 60. From 20% to 100% of them undertake and pass Selectivitat (the
median is 75%). The correlation between size and share of Selectivitat takers is almost 0.
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Note. The graph plots avereage performance for schools with at least 6 students in the sample for each year.
The dotted lines are a linear fit.
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Note. The graph plots data in 2012 for schools with at least 6 students in the sample for each year. The dotted
lines are a linear fit.
12
As shown in Figure 3, in some schools students do much better in Selectivitat than in the
internal grades, while in other schools the opposite happens. The left panel of the figure shows
that schools with a higher share of low SES students tend to have worse outcomes for Selectivitat
than for high school grades. This is not surprising given that, as discussed above, on average
low SES perform relatively worse in Selectivitat than in high school. This descriptive evidence
is also compatible with the grading on the curve documented for primary and lower secondary
education in Catalonia by Calsamiglia and Loviglio (2019): teachers tend to inflate grades in
classes where performance are below average, and to deflate them when average performance
are above average. The right panel of the figure documents a positive correlation between the
share of graduate who take (and pass) Selectivitat and the average gap between Selectivitat and
high school GPA. It is also possible that schools in which many students aim to pursue tertiary
education are more likely to provide specific training to maximize the score of the high-stakes
exams.23
3 Empirical analysis
In this section we discuss how Selectivitat, the region-wide exam to access University, can be
predicted using students’ performance in high school. It is worth noting that even though
covariates such as gender or socioeconomics may have an impact on the predicted grade, we
do not use them in the estimation, as the objective is to use the estimated parameters for
prediction. Considering covariates as gender or socioeconomics would imply that the policy
used would treat different students differently because of characteristics that they should not
be held responsible. In next Section 4 we test differences in the predictions across gender and
SES. Moreover, in Section 5 we discuss whether a model that includes individual characteristics
would deliver substantially better prediction, abstracting from any consideration about the
desirability of such model. Hence, for now we study various linear models of Selectivitat as
function of high school GPA, and school and track variables. Estimation is done by OLS,
exploiting observations from students who graduated in 2010 and in 2011. The estimated
23The correlations in the figure are -0.36 (left) and 0.35 (right). Low SES students are slightly less likely to
attend schools with a high share of college enrollment, but differences are small in size: the average low SES
student who enroll in college attended a high school in which 76% of graduates took Selectivitat. This share
slightly increases to 78% for the average high SES student.
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coefficients are then used to perform in-sample predictions, and out-of-sample predictions for
students who graduated in 2012.
3.1 Empirical specifications
Our analysis departs from the following empirical specification:
SELi = αGPA + x
′
iβ + εi, (2)
ŜELi = α̂GPA + x
′
iβ̂ (3)
where the dependent variable is student’s i score in Selectivitat, and the right hand side includes
high school GPA, a vector of other covariates xi and the error term, εi.
24
The specifications presented in Table 2 differ for the set of covariates xi used. We start
with a simple univariate regression of Selectivitat on high school GPA in column (1). For the
purpose of students’ allocation to majors and colleges, this model is fully equivalent to cancelling
Selectivitat and relying only on high school GPA. In the following columns, we augment this
specification with other covariates, to give more weight to subjects that are directly tested in
Selectivitat, and to account for systematic differences due to track or high school attended.
We add dummies for the track attended (from col(2)), peer GPA (col(2)), school fixed effects
(cols (3) and (5)). Moreover, in column (4) and (5), we include high school evaluations for
the subjects that are more relevant for Selectivitat (Catalan, Spanish, English, History or
Philosophy, and the mean of track-specific subjects, as described in Section 2).
Equation (2) is estimated using the first two cohorts of students. Estimated parameters
are used to predict SELi for all students. This approach relies on the assumption that the
parameters in equation (2) are time-invariant, and therefore that previous cohorts can be used
to infer the parameters and predict the outcomes of new cohorts. This is necessary for the
prediction to be correct, namely to ensure that on average the predicted Selectivitat equals the
observed one, but it is not enough to ensure that it is accurate, namely that the error in the
prediction is reasonably small for all individuals. In fact, the larger the unexplained variation
in the outcome (i.e. the larger the variance of the error εi in equation (2)), the less precise
24In the estimation, errors are clustered at the school level. The structure of the errors does not matter for
the prediction, but it is relevant to comment on the significance of the coefficients.
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the prediction is. Hence, for many students the predicted Selectivitat could be substantially
different from the actual one. For each specification, we compute several measures of in-sample
and out-of-sample goodness of fit to test the accuracy of the prediction: the coefficient of
determination (R2), the root mean square error (RMSE), the mean absolute error (AME), and
the absolute rank deviation. While the first three are pretty standard, the last one deserve
some additional explanations. The absolute rank deviation (ARD) gives us a measure of how
different two ranks are. To compute it, we rank students by year using the observed Selectivitat,
SELi, and the predicted, ŜELi. Ranks are rescaled to be between 0 and 1, thus the difference
between ranks corresponds to the percentiles lost or gained by a given students if ŜELi were
used rather than SELi.





|rank(SEL)i − rank(ŜEL)i| (4)
We believe that this statistic is particularly relevant to evaluate the goodness of fit in the
current setting. In fact, when high-stakes exams are used to allocate students to opportunities,
a student’s position in the rank can be more salient than the cardinal value of the test score.
This is particularly true in our case, where student assignment to majors is fully determined
by their rank and their stated preferences.25 The absolute rank deviation of two independent
variables is 1
3
, therefore in our analysis we expect this statistic to lie between 0 and 0.33.26
3.2 Results
As shown in column (1) of Table 2, more than 40% of the variance in Selectivitat is explained
by high school GPA alone. On average, the absolute value of the difference between actual and
25As explained in Section 2, the final rank used to allocate students relies on an entry score that is a weighted
average of Selectivitat and GPA. For the purpose of assessing the quality of our predictions, we believe that it
is more relevant to look at Selectivitat alone, given that the entry score is mechanically correlated with GPA,
the main regressor used to predict Selectivitat.
26Let (ai,ãi) be N realizations of two continuous random variables a and ã, and ri and r̃i their respective
ranks. If Cov(a, ã) = 0, then E(|ri − r̃i|) = 13 . In fact:






































predict Selectivitat is 0.6 s.d., and the absolute rank deviation is almost 19 percentiles. These
statistics are remarkably similar for the in-sample and the out-of-sample prediction. On one
hand, this confirms that the relationship between the high-stakes exam and the high school
GPA is stable over time, therefore it is appropriate to use past cohorts to retrieve the relevant
parameters. On the other hand, there is a lot left unexplained and therefore predictions are
not very precise.
The remaining columns of the table show that adding covariates improves the out-of-sample
predictive power, but not dramatically. Column (2) shows that being in the Scientific or Art
tracks is associated with a small negative effects on Selectivitat (significant in some of the
specifications), but do not improve the fit of the model. Peer GPA (on top of own GPA) is not
correlated with the outcome.27 As shown in column (3) adding school dummies has a sizable
effects on the in-sample goodness of fit. In particular the R2 improves from 0.44 to 0.51, the
MAE decreases by almost 0.05 s.d. and the ARD decrease by about 1.6 percentiles. However,
the improvements are lower for the out-of-sample predictions, for instance the R2 goes from 0.42
to 0.45. Given that we use only two cohorts of data, school effects are probably capturing also
short term differences across schools, thus their contribution to the out-of-sample prediction is
positive but relatively low. We cannot rule out that exploiting a longer horizon to estimate the
model would bring a larger improvement to the predictive power.
As displayed in column (4), high school subjects specific to Selectivitat have a large effect
on the outcome and capture most of the effect of the overall GPA. Including these covariates
raises goodness of fit both in-sample and out-of-sample in a similar way. Adding school effects,
as in column (5), further improve the statistics. Figure 10 in the Appendix shows that the
estimated school effects are sizeable (for instance the interquantile range is about 0.3 s.d.),
but their correlation with the average difference between Selectivitat and GPA in the school is
noticeably smaller in the out-of-sample year than in the previous year.
In this final specification, out-of-sample R2 is 0.51, MAE is 0.55 s.d., and ARD is 16.7
percentiles. In other words, the richest model cannot account for almost half of the variation in
the outcome. Consequently, prediction errors can be pretty large and this may have a sizable
effect on ranks and therefore on students’ allocation to majors.
27Peer GPA is the average GPA of students who graduate in the same school and year, including those who
did not take Selectivitat. Given that the coefficient is virtually 0 we do not include it in further analyses.
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Table 2: Selectivitat. Regressions and predictions
(a) In sample (cohorts 2010 and 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High School GPA 0.670** 0.669** 0.681** 0.174** 0.0995**
(0.0099) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0235) (0.0192)
Art Track -0.106* -0.0794 -0.0959* -0.0335
(0.0495) (0.0684) (0.0488) (0.0568)
Scientific Track 0.00536 -0.0109 -0.0396** -0.0599**
(0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0140)








Foreign Language 0.351** 0.354**
(0.0109) (0.0094)
Track subjects 0.0773** 0.0911**
(0.0132) (0.0106)
School FE No No Yes No Yes
N 20425 20425 20425 20425 20425
R2 0.442 0.442 0.518 0.507 0.585
RMSE 0.747 0.746 0.694 0.701 0.644
MAE 0.598 0.597 0.552 0.559 0.510
abs rank deviation 0.187 0.187 0.169 0.171 0.154
(b) Out of sample (cohort 2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
R2 0.424 0.425 0.448 0.493 0.512
RMSE 0.758 0.758 0.742 0.712 0.698
MAE 0.607 0.607 0.592 0.567 0.553
abs rank deviation 0.189 0.189 0.183 0.173 0.167
Note. The dependent variable is the score in the high-stakes exam Selectivitat. Selectivitat, high school GPA,
and other evaluations used as regressors have been standardized at the year level to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. The sample for panel (a) includes students who graduated from a public high school in Catalonia
in 2010 and 2011. The sample for panel (b) includes students who graduated from a public high school in
Catalonia in 2012. Errors are clustered at the school level. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.3 Robustness checks
As explained in Section 2, we drop from the main analysis students for whom we could not
retrieve all the evaluations used in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2. As a robustness checks, we
estimate the models in columns (1) to (3) on this larger sample. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5
in Appendix A show that results are virtually unchanged.
Another potential concern is that most of the observations dropped belong to students who
repeated the last year of high school twice and graduated in 2009. Thus to some extent the 2009
cohort is positively selected because it has less retained students than the following cohorts 2010
and 2011. To show that this does not affect the results, we replicate the analysis in columns
(1), (4), and (5) using only the 2010 cohort to estimate the models. Again, Table 5 shows
that results are quite similar to the finding in Table 2. Out-of-sample statistics are virtually
identical for the models without school fixed effects, and only slightly worse for the model with
school FE (e.g. the R2 is 0.50 rather than 0.53, the MAE is 0.57 rather than 0.55). This is not
surprising given that the estimation relies only one cohort of data, thus it cannot average out
idiosyncratic shocks at the school/year level.
Moreover, we estimate models (1) and (5) on a subsample of “big” schools, namely the
schools in which at least 20 students each year undertake Selectivitat (about 60% of the sample).
The purpose of this exercise is to rule out that including school effects do not dramatically
improve predictions because they are not precisely estimate for smaller schools. Results in
column (7) and (8) of Table 5 show that the goodness of fit for this subsample is very similar
to the baseline one.
Finally, we replicate the analysis using only the subsample of observations for which a perfect
match was retrieved when merging high school and Selectivitat data (as described in Section
2.2). Column (9) replicates model (5) in Table 2. Results are almost identical, if anything the
fit of the model is marginally better.
4 Analysis by subgroups
Any prediction of students’ grades should aim at being both precise and fair, i.e., being equally
precise across demographic groups. This does not imply that any differences across groups
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between high school and Selectivitat test scores are fair, but simply that the prediction does
not affect those differences.
Figure 4 displays the density of the prediction error (ŜELi−SELi) for the simplest prediction
model (model (1), with only High School GPA), and the most saturated model (model (5),
including school effects and other academic variables). The figure shows that the predictions
are not very precise, and suggests that male test scores are relatively under-predicted. This is
consistent with the descriptive evidence in Section 2.3, and it is aligned with previous findings
in the literature that females tend to outperform males in lower stakes more often than in
high-stakes exams.28
To quantify these differences, Table 3 reports the estimates of regressions of different mea-
sures of prediction error on a female dummy. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is
the prediction error in test scores, which is the difference between predicted and actual scores:
ŜELi−SELi. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the absolute value of this prediction
error, which is a measure of its variability. In columns 5 and 6, it is the difference between the
student rank implied by the predicted test score and the actual rank: Rank(ŜELi)−Rank(SELi).
In columns 7 and 8, the absolute value of this rank difference. Rank differences are important
because the allocation of students to academic programmes with capacity constraints ultimately
depends on their rank. For instance, a high prediction error at a part of the distribution with
a low density of students may result in large differences in test scores prediction errors but in
modest differences in rank prediction errors, and hence, be less consequential.
In Table 3, the intercept shows the average prediction error for males (the omitted category),
and the female coefficient measures the gender difference in the prediction error. As suggested
by Figure 4, the estimates show that male test scores are under-predicted by the model (.095
s.d.), while female test scores are over-predicted. The gender difference in the prediction error
is around 0.156 standard deviations (s.d.), or between 6 and 7 percentiles.29 These differences
are large, because descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the average gender difference in
Selectivitat test scores is 0.012 s.d. In absolute value, however, there are no significant gender
differences in the prediction error, which means that the dispersion of the prediction error
is about the same for male and female students. Importantly, models (1) and (5) perform
28Azmat et al. (2016); Cai et al. (2019); Arenas and Calsamiglia (2019); Schlosser et al. (2019).
29Figure 11 in the the Appendix shows the distribution of the prediction error in terms of students’ rank.
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rather similarly across all prediction quality measures, which means that school effects and
other academic variables are rather orthogonal to the gender differences in prediction quality.
Despite the significant difference in prediction errors by gender, the R2 of all the models in
table 3 is very low, indicating that gender differences in prediction quality explain very little
(2% at most) of the overall variation in prediction quality across students.
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Predicted Score − Actual Score
Males Females
Model (5)
Note. Differences between predicted and actual rank, cohort 2012
Table 3: By gender
Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Rank | Predicted - Actual Rank |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 0.156∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.00686 0.0102 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ -0.00295 0.000705
(10.58) (11.69) (0.77) (1.22) (15.06) (14.28) (-0.95) (0.25)
Constant -0.0947∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ -0.0433∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(-8.47) (-7.76) (89.91) (87.30) (-11.78) (-11.32) (80.16) (78.22)
Model Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5)
R2 0.0103 0.0126 0.0000554 0.000138 0.0209 0.0187 0.0000851 0.00000594
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
Header indicates the dependent variable. Omitted category: males. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In a similar vein, Figure 5 displays the density of the prediction error for the simplest and
the most saturated prediction models, across parental Socio Economic Status (SES) categories,
which are defined according to parental education. The figure suggests that high SES test
scores are the most under-predicted, especially in the simplest model, while low SES test scores
are over-predicted. Again, this is not surprising, given that, as discussed in Section 2.3, high
SES students tend to outperform other students especially in higher stakes exams.
Table 4 reports the estimates of regressions of different measures of prediction error on a
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dummy for being high SES and a dummy for being average SES, the base category being low
SES. As suggested by Figure 5, the estimates show that the test scores of high SES students
are under-predicted by the model and those of low SES students are over-predicted, while the
predicted test scores of average SES students are well predicted, on average. This is consistent
with the descriptives in Table 1, which show that the magnitude of the high school differences
in GPA across SES groups is amplified in Selectivitat test scores. The estimates in Table 4
show that when compared to the baseline category of low SES students, high SES students’
scores are under-predicted by between 0.15 and 0.3 s.d. while average SES students’ scores are
under-predicted by between 0.7 and 0.14 s.d. on average. The magnitude of these estimates is
large, considering that the average unconditional differences in Selectivitat test scores between
high and low SES students are 0.5 s.d.; and between average and low SES students, around
0.2 s.d. At the same time, the results in columns 3 and 4, where the dependent variable is the
absolute value of the prediction error, show that the prediction error for lower SES students
has a higher dispersion.30
However, in contrast with gender differences, a more saturated model with school fixed
effects (i.e., model (5)) considerably reduces the differences in prediction errors across groups,
both on average and in dispersion, even if significant differences remain. This means that school
effects and other academic covariates pick up some of the differences in prediction quality across
SES categories, but very few gender differences. A similar pattern emerges in columns 5 to 8,
which report regressions where the dependent variables are the prediction errors in terms of
actual and predicted student ranks. Compared to the base category of low SES students, the
rank of high SES students is underpredicted by between 6 and 1.5 percentiles, and the rank
of average SES students is underpredicted by between 4 and 1 percentiles. Again, despite the
significant differences in prediction errors across groups, the R2 of all the models in Table 4 is
very low, indicating that SES differences in prediction quality explain very little (2.4% at most)
of the overall variation in prediction quality across students.
The low R2 of the regressions of prediction errors on individual characteristics suggest that
differences across gender and SES explain only a small part of the differences between high
school grades and Selectivitat at the individual level. In next Section we confirm this intuition
augmenting the prediction models with a vector of individual characteristics.
30Figure 12 in the the Appendix shows the distribution of the prediction error in terms of students’ rank.
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Predicted Score − Actual Score
Low SES Avg SES High SES
Model (5)
Note. Differences between predicted and actual rank, cohort 2012
Table 4: By SES
Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Rank | Predicted - Actual Rank |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High SES -0.303∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗ -0.0600∗∗∗ -0.0145∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗
(-15.74) (-8.25) (-4.03) (-2.61) (-9.52) (-2.58) (-6.62) (-3.66)
Avg SES -0.144∗∗∗ -0.0678∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0225∗ -0.0398∗∗∗ -0.0123∗ -0.0108∗∗ -0.00507
(-7.54) (-3.84) (-3.35) (-2.07) (-6.28) (-2.20) (-2.71) (-1.41)
Constant 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.00902∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(10.64) (6.62) (69.15) (67.08) (7.17) (2.04) (63.96) (61.46)
Model Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5)
R2 0.0237 0.00660 0.00169 0.000679 0.00866 0.000695 0.00440 0.00133
N 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638
Header indicates the dependent variable. Omitted category: low SES. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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We report additional results in the Appendix, splitting the sample using other parental
background covariates, with similar conclusions. Concretely, in Figure 14 and Table 15 in
the Appendix the sample is split according to students’ expected Selectivitat scores based on
a more precise set of parental background variables (rather than the high-average-low SES
classification based on education). These are estimated with a regression of Selectivitat scores
on the full vector of dummies for mother and father high, average, low, or missing education,
and for maternal and paternal occupational categories (services, manager, or unknown), for
the prediction sample. The predicted performance is split in 3 quantiles, to make it easier to
visualize. The prediction is done solely with parental background variables, which are not used
in the prediction of grades, to avoid any mechanical correlation between the prediction error
and the actual prediction. The results show, in a similar vein, that students that tend to do
well based on parental variables are especially good at Selectivitat (compared to high school),
and hence the prediction models underestimates their performance, although the variance of
the prediction is lower for them.
5 Alternative prediction approaches
The baseline results are based on simple linear models. These models have the advantage of
being transparent and easy to understand by policy-makers and the public. However, other
more sophisticated prediction methods could outperform the linear model’s predictions. In this
section, we study the performance of two machine learning methods, namely Lasso Regressions
and Random Forests.
Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) regressions are a form of
penalized regressions, typically estimated on a large number of candidate predictors,













, where λ > 0 is the Lasso penalty param-
eter, and ωj are the penalty loadings. Lasso regressions are estimated via cross-validation:
slicing the sample into different parts, a training sample and a testing sample, the estimates
maximize the predictive power of the training samples on the testing samples (Athey and Im-
bens, 2019).31 In principle, we would expect LASSO to outperform OLS, because it keeps the
31In this case, the prediction sample is sliced into 10 folds, as suggested by Kuhn and Johnson (2013) or
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same functional form, and reduces the prediction’s noise by setting the coefficients of irrelevant
predictors to zero.
Random forests are estimated by randomly drawing bootstrap samples and estimating re-
gression trees over them, and then averaging out the results. A regression tree is estimated in
a step-wise fashion. At each step, the algorithm splits the data into subsets, and among all the
possible splits, the algorithm selects the one that minimizes the prediction error, jointly defined
by choosing an independent variable and a splitting value. Whether the random forest model
outperform OLS is a matter of relative functional form misspecification. If the relationship be-
tween high school GPA and Selectivitat is quite non-linear, we would expect random forests to
improve on linear models, but not necessarily otherwise. See (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017)
and (Athey and Imbens, 2019) for further details.
Figure 6 displays the density of the prediction error from different methods, using the
predictors of model (5) (school dummies and other academic variables). The results show that
in this context, LASSO does slightly better but almost identically, and Random Forests do a
little worse.
Finally, one may wonder whether including individual characteristics as predictors could
improve the quality of the prediction. This is often seen as problematic for a variety of reasons
which we do not aim at discussing in this paper, but it is nonetheless interesting to see how
far individual characteristics go in improving test scores’ predictions. To this aim, we replicate
the analysis in Section 3 and in this section including also gender and socio-economic charac-
teristics of the students. More specifically, Table 6 augments our preferred linear specification
with gender (column (1)), parental background (column (2)), gender and parental background
together (column (3)), postal code effects (column (4)), all of the above (column (5)). Adding
gender and parental background characteristics slightly improve the out-of-sample predictions,
but the difference is almost negligible. For instance the RMSE decreases from 0.7 to 0.6 and
the absolute rank deviation decreases from 16.7 to 16.5 percentiles. Including the postal code
fixed effects probably causes an over fit of the model in-sample, because the fit of the model
out-of-sample is worse. The estimated coefficients for gender and parental education are signifi-
cant and sizeable, but, as already stressed in Section 4, average differences across gender or SES
explain only a small part of the overall variation between high school grades and Selectivitat.
Kohavi (1995), but other methods of selecting λ (3 folds, or the one-standard-error rule) give similar results.
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Most of it appears to be idiosyncratic. It is also worth noting the school effects estimated when
socio-economic characteristics are added are extremely similar to the one in our preferred spec-
ification.32 This suggests that at least part of the school effects measure across school variation
in grading policy: if they were only capturing systematic variation in the demographics of the
schools, they would shrink when socio-economic characteristics are added as covariates.
We also augment the LASSO and RF models discussed in this Section with individual
characteristics. The density of the prediction error from the different errors are displayed in
Figure 16 in the Appendix. This provides further confirmation that in this setting there appears
to be no major gain from including individual pre-determined characteristics in the prediction
model.
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Note: Differences between predicted and actual rank, cohort 2012.
6 Simulation: perturbed Selectivitat
Previous sections discuss to what extent predictions based on high school evaluations are a
viable replacements for high-stakes exams to access college. A different but related question is
how much school disruption would affect high-stakes exams and therefore students’ allocation
to college. Ideally, one would like to know the counterfactual score in the absence of disruption
and estimate the expected loss (or gain) among individuals with given characteristics. Results
32The correlation of school effects from the baseline specification with the school effects from column (3) in
Table 6 is 0.97. The two distributions are also very similar.
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could be compared with the loss or gain that would take place if predicted scores were used
instead. While a precise quantification of the effects of school disruption on students’ allocation
to colleges is beyond the scope of this paper, in this section we perform some simulation exercises
to explore the consequences of perturbing Selectivitat on student rank.
Let G1, ..., Gg be a partition of the population into g subgroups (for instance a partition by
low, average, and high SES). Let SELi be the true performance of student i who belongs to
group Gj. The perturbed performance is
S̃ELi = SELi + εi, εi ∼ N (µGj , σGj) (7)
where the error term is a random draw from a normal distribution with group-specific mean µGj
and standard deviation σGj . In this section we denote ri and r̃i the rank of student i computed
using SELi and S̃ELi respectively.
33


























































Note. The dashed red line plot the absolute rank deviation if predicted Selectivitat is used (model (5))
In the first exercise, we assume that εi ∼ N (0, σ), i.e. the noise generating process, is the
same for everyone. We perform the same simulation for 300 values of σ, from 0.01 to 3: we
33Note that the perturbed score should be rescaled or truncated so that it belongs to the appropriate interval
for Selectivitat. Focusing on the rank rather than on the cardinal values allow us to ignore this technicality.
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draw random shocks for every individual in the sample, generate the perturbed Selectivitat,
rank students, and finally compute the absolute difference between r̃i and ri. This is replicated
100 times and results are averaged out to compute the absolute rank deviation for each σ.
Results are shown in the left panel of Figure 7: the y-axis plots the ARD and the x-axis plots
the noise to Selectivitat ratio. Given that Selectivitat is normalized to have mean 0 and s.d. 1,
the noise to Selectivitat ratio corresponds to σ. Not surprisingly, the ARD is increasing in σ.34
For comparison, the ARD for our preferred predictive model using high school evaluations is
16.7 percentiles. To obtain the same value, σ should be about 0.95. In other words, the variance
of the noise should be almost as large as the variance of the true measure of performance to
produce the same ARD as the prediction based on internal evaluations.
In the right panel of Figure 7, we replicate the analysis allowing µG to vary by parental
education: more specifically, we assume that low SES are hit more negatively than high SES,
and average SES are somewhere in between, i.e. µL ≤ µM ≤ µH . In fact, not all students are
affected in the same way by a prolonged period of school closure: those who do not have at
home the necessary resources to access distance-learning or study on their own are for sure more
severely hit. Kuhfeld et al. (2020) revise the literature on school absenteeism: averaging the
finding of several papers they suggest that missing a school day decreases test scores by almost
0.007 s.d.35 During the COVID-19 outbreak, schools were closed for almost 3 months; taking
at face value the estimate in Kuhfeld et al. (2020), this would correspond to a loss of about 0.4
s.d. for those who did not have access to education in that period.36 In one of the simulation in
Figure 7, we set µL = −0.4, while µM and µH stay at 0 (continuous red line). For small values
of σ, the ARD is sizeably larger than in the baseline case (it is 4 percentiles when σ is close
to 0); the gap decreases with σ and the two lines in the graph eventually overlap. In another
simulation, we assume that also students with average SES are negatively hit, although less
34A graph with a longer x-axis would show that it slowly converges to 33 p.p. ARD is above 30 p.p. for
σ > 10.
35Maldonado and De Witte (2020) is the only study in our knowledge that analyze the drop in test scores
after the COVID-19 outbreak, using data from Flemish schools in Belgium. They find that after 7 weeks of
school closures, test scores decreases by 0.19-0.29 s.d. These estimates are remarkably similar to the figures
suggested by the literature on school absenteeism. Both this study and Kuhfeld et al. (2020) consider students
in primary or lower secondary education, and focus only on Mathematics and reading or literature. Admittedly,
their external validity for students near the end of upper secondary education is unclear. Given the illustrative
purpose of our exercises, we believe that their estimates provide a nice benchmark nonetheless.
36Schools were closed from March 13, 2020 to June 19, 2020; assuming a school week of 5 days and not
counting holidays, this corresponds to 62 days.
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than those with low SES, and set µM = −0.2 (continuous green line in the figure). For all values
of σ, the ARD is slightly smaller than the one in the previous simulation: if more students are
negatively affected by school disruption, overall performance decrease but the ranking changes
relatively less, because the gap between low and average SES is reduced. Figure 7 also shows
the outcomes of simulations that set much larger penalties for low and average SES ( µL = −1
and µM = −0.5, dotted red and green lines in the figure). While for small values of σ the ARD
is much larger than in the baseline exercise, it is still lower than the ARD of our preferred
predictive model for σ < 0.9.
Low performing students are generally favored by a larger noise. At the extremes, perturbing
the score can only improve the rank of the worst student, while it can only worsen the rank of
the best student. More in general, as previously shown in Figure 1, the density of Selectivitat
is much higher around the mean than in the tails. When someone in the left tail is hit by a
positive shock, they typically gain more positions in the rank that what they would lose if hit
by a negative shock of the same size. Vice-versa, students in the right tail usually gain fewer
positions when receiving a positive shock than what they would lose for a negative shock of the
same size. This intuition is confirmed by panel (a) of Table 7 in the Appendix, which displays
the average difference r̃i − ri by quantile of Selectivitat, for various values of σ, when µG = 0
for all groups G. On average, for students in the bottom quartile the rank r̃i is higher than the
baseline rank ri, and the gain is increasing in σ. Conversely, on average r̃i is lower than ri for
those in the top quartile. Given that students with low SES are over-represented in the left tail
of the distribution, and those with high SES are over-represented in the right tail, on average
for low SES r̃i is larger than ri on average. As shown in panel (b), the gains for low SES are
sizable only for large values of σ. Therefore it seems likely that they would be completely offset
by a decrease in µL, which would negatively affect all low SES, while an increase in noise would
only benefit the low performers among them.
We explore the effects of varying the mean shock in the simulations plotted in Figure 8. µL
ranges from -1 s.d. to 0, and µM = 0.5µL. For simplicity, we set µH = 0. In the left panel,
the variance of the shock is negligible ( σ2 = 0.0001), while in the right panel it is as large as
the variance of performance ( σ2 = 1). The rank of students with low parental background
decreases linearly with −µL, while the rank of students with high parental background increases
linearly. Almost nothing changes for those with average parental background: in fact, they do
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relatively worse than the high SES due to the negative shock, but they do relatively better than
the low SES who are hit by a larger shock. When σ is small, shocks have a sizable effects on the
expected rank. For instance, for µL = −0.4, the rank for low SES decreases by 5.6 percentiles,
while the rank for high SES increases by 4.5 percentiles. For µL = −1, the rank decreases by
12.9 and increases by 10.4 respectively. Increasing the variance of the shock reduces the gap,
and reverses it if |µL| is small relatively to σ: this happens for |µL| < 0.2 in the right panel of
the figure. In fact, as we discussed above, adding noise favors students in the left tail of the
distribution of performance, who are over represented among students with low SES.
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7 Discussion and conclusions
College admissions match students to colleges using a combination of high-stakes exams, high
school grades, and potentially other characteristics. The COVID-19 outbreak has forced social
distancing worldwide, and this has made it harder to run large scale exams and hence to decide
on college admissions. Some countries have postponed admission exams, and others have used
historical data to predict students’ performance in the high-stakes exams which would have
taken place in absence of the pandemic. In this paper, we analyse how using the optimal
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predictive model would affect college admissions. That is, we use historical data to train a
model and evaluate its accuracy in a year where the high-stakes exam was run normally. We
find that the optimal prediction is rather simple: a linear model with high school grades and
school characteristics does similarly than more complex and less transparent prediction models.
However, predictions are rather inaccurate in general, and more so for particular subgroups.
Hence, if one aims at constructing a policy that perfectly substitutes high-stakes exams, using
prediction models is questionable.
This paper studies the effect of using a prediction model a relatively short time after an
unexpected shock occurs. More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that in 2020 high school
GPA was not affected by COVID-19: in March most of the grades have already been assigned,
the majority of the material is covered, and mostly the preparation for the high-stakes exams
is relevant. Therefore, differences in access to online teaching, tutoring, and other educational
resources when schools are closed would mainly distort the outcomes of high-stakes exams.
The models presented here would require some adjustments if the outbreak continues to be
inhibiting face-to-face exam taking next year, as the GPA would be itself distorted by the
pandemic. In fact, access to online teaching and educational resources has been extremely
unequal: many students with low SES faces more severe challenges their high SES peers, and
may perform worse than in normal times.37 Understanding these effects is not only crucial for
eventual future predictions of high-stakes exams, but also for evaluating the consequences of
an alternative policy of running high-stakes exams after months of school closure.
In what remains, we will go over some of the solutions adopted by different countries and
discuss the problems that they seem to have generated. In Catalonia, the authorities announced
that the exam was easier, giving students the option to choose a subset of questions to answer.
This ensured that not having covered particular material in school would not harm students
too much. But it also meant that the exam was less difficult than in previous years. Hence
we expect student scores to exhibit more of a bimodal distribution: for those more heavily hit
by the outbreak, the exam was most likely still inaccessible given that they had been locked
at home for four months. For those with a relative stability around them and access to online
37A large number of surveys have evidenced these inequalities worldwide. See, for example, the
policy brief run by the European Comission “Educational inequalities in Europe and physical school
closures during COVID-19”: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/fairness_pb2020_wave04_
covid_education_jrc_i1_19jun2020.pdf
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schooling or tutoring, we expect their grades to be higher than in the past (given that the exam
is substantially easier). Data about the distribution of grades are not available yet, but we
do know that the fraction of students with a grade higher than 9 over 10 has increased and
so has the fraction of students who failed.38 Given that access is determined by the weighted
average of Selectivitat and high school grades, it is likely that if a student was affected by the
outbreak, Selectivitat reduced her capacity to compete for selective programs, while for those
less affected by the outbreak, most variation in entry grades was most likely coming from high
school grades, since variation coming from Selectivitat was smaller at the top. Future access to
these data should help understand the implications of the chosen policy further.
In the UK a predictive model imputed external examinations’ grades.39 When the results
came out there were a number of complaints. A first issue related to how the authorities
dealt with schools with small class sizes or limited historical data (mostly private schools): in
those cases, high school evaluations were used as the predictor. Instead, for other schools a
prediction model similar to the one proposed in this paper was introduced and hence, inequities
present in societies were mirrored by the prediction.40 In particular, schools located in low SES
neighborhoods found that their prediction was lower than the prediction of students with the
same high school GPA but in more affluent neighborhoods. In Catalonia, similarly, in schools
with high concentration of low SES students, on average Selectivitat is lower than high school
GPA. Therefore, for some of them the prediction of a model with school fixed effects is lower
than the prediction without school fixed effects.41
The International Baccalaureate has followed a different strategy that has also induced a
38Number of failures may also be affected by the fact that the fraction of stu-
dents who graduated from high schools also increased. The Spanish press covered ex-
tensively the topic, see for instance https://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20200728/
selectividad-catalunya-2020-notas-pau-8056577 or https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20200806/
482688617975/notas-corte-selectividad-acceso-universidad-catalunya-2020.html
39England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland regulate separately their exams, but they adopted a similar
approach and incurred in similar controversies. For a summary, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_
UK_GCSE_and_A-Level_grading_controversy. The controversy was covered by The Guardian, the BBC and
on twitter as #alevels2020.
40More specifically, teachers formulate a recommendation for the grades of the high-stakes exams, based on
student performance in school and in mock exams administered during the year. For the first group of schools
the final grades simply mirrored the teachers’ proposals. For the other schools, proposals were adjusted using
historical data.
41In the end, in the UK the administrations decided not to use any prediction model, but to use teacher
evaluations for all students, because the prediction model was harming more vulnerable students.
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large number of complaints.42 In their case the problem is slightly different. They used historical
data on grades provided by teachers and analysed how they related to final grades. However
they also complemented grades provided by teachers this year with externally provided grades.
The problem was that it was not clear how they used these external evaluations to correct their
prediction models, since this external source of data was only available to them this year, not
in historical data. This lack of transparency complicated the process and led to a subsequent
adjustment in grades.
To sum up, COVID-19 has inhibited the capacity to run high-stakes exams and has forced
countries to think how to resolve college admissions, usually heavily based on high-stakes exams.
This paper highlights some of the challenges of using historical high school data to predict high-
stakes exams in a given year, but also indirectly opens an important question: is the result of
the high-stakes exams what we want to predict? High-stakes exams are used to measure college
preparedness and originated in an era when college performance data were limited. Nowadays,
it seems relevant to study whether high-stakes exams capture skills that other data do not
capture, and whether they are better predictor of success in college than performance in high
school. Also, in cases like the current pandemic, given that in most countries data on high
school and college performance are available, we may want to contrast predicting high-stakes
exams versus directly predicting college performance to resolve college admissions.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
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Note. Distributions of school size (i.e. number of graduates) and share of students who took Selectivitat, years
2010-2012. Only schools with at least 6 students who took Selectivitat in each year are included. The continuous
black lines are kernel density plots.
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Note. The graph plots data for schools with at least 6 students in the sample for each year. The dotted lines
are a linear fit.
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Table 5: Selectivitat. Robustness checks.
(a) In sample
Cohorts 2010-2011 Cohorts 2011 Large schools 1-1 match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High School GPA 0.661** 0.662** 0.671** 0.668** 0.157** 0.0389 0.685** 0.118** 0.0942**
(0.0129) (0.0102) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0314) (0.0247) (0.0087) (0.0268) (0.0197)
Art Track -0.107* -0.0711 -0.0754 -0.0535 -0.0473 -0.0384
(0.0466) (0.0652) (0.0672) (0.0587) (0.0647) (0.0581)
Scientific Track 0.00422 -0.0115 -0.0703** -0.0947** -0.0534** -0.0637**
(0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0205) (0.0214) (0.0162) (0.0143)
Peer average GPA -0.0424
(0.0770)
Catalan 0.0496* 0.124** 0.104** 0.112**
(0.0194) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0113)
Spanish 0.0638** 0.103** 0.0882** 0.0846**
(0.0193) (0.0130) (0.0144) (0.0110)
History/Philosophy 0.0977** 0.127** 0.116** 0.120**
(0.0164) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0117)
Foreign Language 0.353** 0.362** 0.351** 0.356**
(0.0132) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0095)
Track subjects 0.105** 0.117** 0.0901** 0.0934**
(0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0139) (0.0107)
School FE No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes
N 21426 21426 21426 10367 10367 10367 12474 12474 19684
R2 0.437 0.438 0.510 0.445 0.509 0.606 0.467 0.598 0.590
RMSE 0.750 0.750 0.700 0.744 0.700 0.627 0.728 0.633 0.639
MAE 0.600 0.600 0.556 0.591 0.553 0.490 0.585 0.504 0.508
Abs. rank deviation 0.188 0.188 0.171 0.185 0.169 0.146 0.184 0.153 0.153
(b) Out of sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
N 10728 10728 10728 10654 10654 10654 6381 6381 10260
R2 0.423 0.424 0.447 0.424 0.493 0.487 0.448 0.527 0.519
RMSE 0.759 0.759 0.743 0.758 0.711 0.716 0.741 0.685 0.692
MAE 0.608 0.608 0.593 0.607 0.567 0.568 0.593 0.546 0.550
Abs. rank deviation 0.190 0.190 0.183 0.189 0.173 0.172 0.186 0.166 0.166
Note. Errors are clustered at the school level. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Selectivitat. Regressions and predictions adding individual characteristics.
(a) In sample (cohorts 2010 and 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.198** -0.193** -0.194**
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108)
Mother high school 0.0224+ 0.0220+ 0.0216+
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0124)
Mother college 0.0574** 0.0495** 0.0462**
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0145)
Father high school 0.0503** 0.0447** 0.0438**
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0131)
Father college 0.0897** 0.0790** 0.0773**
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0128)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Parental background No Yes Yes No Yes
Zip Code FE No No No Yes Yes
N 20425 20425 20425 20425 20425
R2 0.593 0.587 0.595 0.593 0.603
RMSE 0.637 0.642 0.636 0.638 0.630
MAE 0.504 0.508 0.503 0.506 0.499
abs rank deviation 0.151 0.153 0.151 0.152 0.150
(b) Out of sample (cohort 2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
R2 0.518 0.516 0.521 0.508 0.517
RMSE 0.693 0.695 0.691 0.701 0.695
MAE 0.549 0.551 0.547 0.556 0.552
abs rank deviation 0.165 0.166 0.165 0.168 0.166
Note. “Male”, “Mother primary/middle school”, “Father primary/middle school” are the omitted categories
when gender and/or parental education variables are used. Other parental background variables include in (2),
(3), and (5) are, for both mother and father, dummies for missing info about education, and dummies for
broad categories of occupation (Manager, Services, Blue collar job, Does not work or retired). Errors are
clustered at the school level. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 15: By Expected Score
Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Rank | Predicted - Actual Rank |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Expected Rank -0.279∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.0417∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗ -0.0513∗∗∗ -0.0101 -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗
(-15.67) (-8.06) (-3.86) (-2.80) (-8.85) (-1.95) (-6.84) (-4.03)
Avg Expected Rank -0.144∗∗∗ -0.0682∗∗∗ -0.0266∗ -0.0107 -0.0391∗∗∗ -0.0120∗ -0.00808∗ -0.00178
(-7.96) (-4.08) (-2.44) (-1.04) (-6.57) (-2.26) (-2.14) (-0.52)
Constant 0.136∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.00629 0.201∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(10.53) (6.70) (80.19) (78.00) (6.76) (1.67) (74.19) (71.07)
Model Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5)
R2 0.0223 0.00596 0.00143 0.000729 0.00786 0.000576 0.00453 0.00174
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
Header indicates the dependent variable. Omitted category: low expected rank. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Expected rank based on a regression of test scores on parental characteristics.
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Table 7: Simulation. Differences in rank by subgroups
(a) Quantiles of Selectivitat
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2
r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r|
1 (low SEL) 0.2 1.8 4.3 8.7 11.8 16.2 21.5 25.2
2 0.1 2.8 1.4 12.5 3.9 19.0 7.2 23.2
3 -0.1 2.7 -2.1 12.1 -4.9 18.9 -7.7 23.4
4 (high SEL) -0.2 1.5 -3.6 7.4 -10.8 14.9 -21.0 24.6
All 0.0 2.2 0.0 10.2 0.0 17.2 0.0 24.1
(b) Parental education
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2
r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r| r̃ − r |r̃ − r|
Low 0.0 2.2 0.8 10.4 2.5 17.4 4.0 23.9
Average 0.0 2.2 0.3 10.3 0.3 17.3 0.8 24.2
High -0.1 2.1 -0.9 9.9 -2.1 17.0 -3.8 24.2
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B Selectivitat Total
In the main analysis, we have focused on the first and compulsory component of Selectivitat,
the so-called Selectivitat General, because it has the advantage of having a common structure
for all students in the sample. The second part, the Selectivitat Espećıfica, consists of exams
in the remaining high school track subjects, and is not compulsory. At most, two additional
exams may count for admission, and the weight that these subjects carry in the admission score
depends on how relevant they are for the program where the student is applying. In this section
we provide the main results when predicting the Selectivitat Total score (sum of the general
and specific parts), which is the relevant score for admission. This additional analysis leads to
very similar conclusions.
The admission score is computed according to the following formula:
Admission score = 60× (High School GPA) + 40× (Selectivitat General GPA)
+WA × (Field Subject A GPA) +WB × (Field Subject B GPA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selectivitat Espećıfica
, (8)
where WA, WB can be 10 or 20 depending on their relevance for the degree where the
student is applying. The initial score used in the admission process is computed using weights
and exams that maximize the admission score for the preferred program in the application list.
If the student cannot be allocated to the preferred choice, the score for the second best program
is used, and so on moving down the list.
In June of each year, a first round of the application algorithm to match students and
programs is performed. At this point, students have the option to accept the outcome of
the algorithm: to do so they have to delete the programs in their application list above the
assigned one, and they can then enrol in the accepted program. In our data, these students are
recorded as having accepted their preferred choice, and we do not observe deleted programs.
Alternatively, they can wait for additional re-allocation rounds performed during Summer: in
case some other student initially allocated to one of their most preferred programs do not
enrol, they can take their slot. For this second group of students we observe the full list of
preferences.43 Overall, 78% of students in our sample are recorded has having enrolled in their
43As a further alternative, in September they can submit a new application for the programs which have not
41
preferred choice; this suggests that probably many of them accepted the initial allocation after
the first round without waiting for additional rounds.
In the analysis in this section we compute “Selectivitat Total” as a weighted sum of Selec-
tivitat General and Selectivitat Espećıfica. For the latter, we use exams and weights for the top
program that we observe, with the caveat that it is either the actual preferred choice, or the
program accepted after deleting the higher ranked options. In our sample, 85% of students take
at least one additional exam, and 55% take two additional exams. The average unconditional
weight in our sample is 13.2 (with zero weights for students who do not take the additional
exams). The average weight conditional on taking an exam is 18.9, in fact the weight is 20 in
90% of the cases.
Columns (1) to (5) of Table 8 replicate Table 2. Columns (6) and (7) augment the regressors
in (4) and (5) with the additional covariates “Best subject” and “Second best subject”. To
compute those variables we associate each observed elective subjects in high school with an
exam that students can undertake for Selectivitat Espećıfica. Then, we multiply the evaluations
for the weights that the associated exams have for the student preferred choice and rank the
resulting scores. Finally, we identify the best and second best subject according to the rank,
and use their evaluation as regressors.44 Overall results are extremely similar to what discussed
in Section 3. Model (7) has the best out-of-sample performance; for instance the MAE is 0.55
s.d. and the ARD is 16.2 percentiles.
Figures 17 and 18 and Tables 9 and 10 are the analogous of Figures 4 and 5 and Tables 3
and 4. Again, the results are very similar, with only one exception, which is that when looking
at Selectivitat Total, female test scores are still over-predicted by a similar magnitude, but also
the prediction error is a little less disperse (columns 3 and 4, Table 9).
reached their capacity constraint, and the same allocation procedure takes place for these students and slots.
44If no observed subjects has positive weight, a 0 is imputed instead.
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Table 8: Selectivitat total. Regressions and predictions.
(a) In sample (cohorts 2010 and 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High School GPA 0.663** 0.671** 0.686** 0.121** 0.0650** 0.132** 0.0757**
(0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0100) (0.0249) (0.0215) (0.0245) (0.0212)
Art Track 0.128* 0.146+ 0.105* 0.133 0.150** 0.178*
(0.0520) (0.0863) (0.0509) (0.0822) (0.0469) (0.0745)
Scientific Track -0.108** -0.123** -0.102** -0.117** -0.0910** -0.107**
(0.0170) (0.0165) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0169)
Peer average GPA 0.0304
(0.0456)
Catalan 0.0191 0.0543** 0.0194 0.0546**
(0.0145) (0.0114) (0.0141) (0.0108)
Spanish 0.0661** 0.0749** 0.0644** 0.0736**
(0.0155) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0103)
History/Philosophy 0.0564** 0.0761** 0.0523** 0.0717**
(0.0122) (0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0092)
Foreign Language 0.194** 0.191** 0.194** 0.190**
(0.0102) (0.0078) (0.0102) (0.0076)
Track subjects 0.337** 0.357** 0.151** 0.180**
(0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0173) (0.0148)
Best subject 0.0223** 0.0230**
(0.0070) (0.0071)
Second best subject 0.106** 0.100**
(0.0053) (0.0056)
School FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 20425 20425 20425 20425 20425 20425 20425
R2 0.438 0.442 0.522 0.479 0.560 0.497 0.576
RMSE 0.744 0.741 0.686 0.716 0.659 0.703 0.646
MAE 0.604 0.601 0.551 0.579 0.528 0.566 0.517
abs rank deviation 0.186 0.185 0.166 0.176 0.157 0.171 0.154
(b) Out of sample (cohort 2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
R2 0.429 0.427 0.447 0.462 0.480 0.503 0.520
RMSE 0.754 0.755 0.742 0.732 0.719 0.703 0.691
MAE 0.605 0.605 0.589 0.584 0.570 0.560 0.547
abs rank deviation 0.184 0.184 0.178 0.175 0.170 0.167 0.162
Note. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: By gender (Sel. Total)
Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Rank | Predicted - Actual Rank |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 0.119∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ -0.00600 -0.00219
(7.97) (8.72) (-5.01) (-3.49) (13.24) (12.18) (-1.96) (-0.76)
Constant -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0520∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ -0.0378∗∗∗ -0.0326∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(-5.41) (-4.75) (94.13) (90.58) (-10.39) (-9.70) (78.92) (77.38)
Model Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5)
R2 0.00600 0.00714 0.00233 0.00113 0.0163 0.0137 0.000362 0.0000536
N 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654 10654
Header indicates the dependent variable. Omitted category: males. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 10: By SES (Sel. Total)
Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Score | Predicted - Actual Rank | Predicted - Actual Rank |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High SES -0.214∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗ -0.0265∗ -0.0349∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗
(-11.20) (-7.22) (-2.59) (-2.37) (-5.69) (-2.66) (-4.69) (-2.94)
Avg SES -0.107∗∗∗ -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.00665 -0.00148 -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0143∗ -0.00360 0.0000534
(-5.58) (-3.44) (-0.57) (-0.13) (-4.79) (-2.53) (-0.92) (0.01)
Constant 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.00980∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(8.29) (6.41) (65.65) (65.37) (4.70) (2.19) (61.65) (60.03)
Model Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5) Model (1) Model (5)
R2 0.0119 0.00497 0.000804 0.000782 0.00336 0.000794 0.00263 0.00128
N 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638 10638





IEB Working Papers  
2017 
 
2017/1, González Pampillón, N.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Can urban renewal policies reverse 
neighborhood ethnic dynamics?” 
2017/2, Gómez San Román, T.: “Integration of DERs on power systems: challenges and opportunities” 
2017/3, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.: “Innovation persistence and employment dynamics” 
2017/4, Curto‐Grau, M.; Solé‐Ollé, A.; Sorribas‐Navarro, P.: “Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?” 
2017/5, Solé‐Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Housing booms and busts and local fiscal policy” 
2017/6, Esteller, A.; Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: “Taxing high-income earners: Tax avoidance and mobility” 
2017/7, Combes, P.P.; Duranton, G.; Gobillon, L.: “The production function for housing: Evidence from France” 
2017/8, Nepal, R.; Cram, L.; Jamasb, T.; Sen, A.: “Small systems, big targets: power sector reforms and renewable 
energy development in small electricity systems” 
2017/9, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: “Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain’s plan E” 
2017/10, Neisser, C.: “The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis” 
2017/11, Baker, E.; Bosetti, V.; Salo, A.: “Finding common ground when experts disagree: robust portfolio decision 
analysis” 
2017/12, Murillo, I.P; Raymond, J.L; Calero, J.: “Efficiency in the transformation of schooling into competences:  
A cross-country analysis using PIAAC data” 
2017/13, Ferrer-Esteban, G.; Mediavilla, M.: “The more educated, the more engaged? An analysis of social capital and 
education” 
2017/14, Sanchis-Guarner, R.: “Decomposing the impact of immigration on house prices” 
2017/15, Schwab, T.; Todtenhaupt, M.: “Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes 
within multinational firms” 
2017/16, Chacón, M.; Jensen, J.: “The institutional determinants of Southern secession” 
2017/17, Gancia, G.; Ponzetto, G.A.M.; Ventura, J.: “Globalization and political structure” 
2017/18, González-Val, R.: “City size distribution and space” 
2017/19, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Pellegrino, G.: “What firms don’t know can hurt them: Overcoming a 
lack of information on technology” 
2017/20, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Why do manufacturing industries invest in energy R&D?” 





2018/1, Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P.: “The tenuous case for an annual wealth tax” 
2018/2, Garcia-López, M.À.: “All roads lead to Rome ... and to sprawl? Evidence from European cities” 
2018/3, Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.; Geys, B.: “Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians’ responses to a political 
scandal” 
2018/4, Cavalcanti, F.; Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.: “Popularity shocks and political selection” 
2018/5, Naval, J.; Silva, J. I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Employment effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition” 
2018/6, Agrawal, D. R.; Foremny, D.: “Relocation of the rich: migration in response to top tax rate changes from 
spanish reforms” 
2018/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Kesidou, E.; Martínez-Ros, E.: “Inter-industry differences in organisational eco-
innovation: a panel data study” 
2018/8, Aastveit, K. A.; Anundsen, A. K.: “Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in regional housing markets” 
2018/9, Curci, F.; Masera, F.: “Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization” 
2018/10, Grossi, L.; Nan, F.: “The influence of renewables on electricity price forecasting: a robust approach” 
2018/11, Fleckinger, P.; Glachant, M.; Tamokoué Kamga, P.-H.: “Energy performance certificates and investments in 
building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis” 
2018/12, van den Bergh, J. C.J.M.; Angelsen, A.; Baranzini, A.; Botzen, W.J. W.; Carattini, S.; Drews, S.; Dunlop, 
T.; Galbraith, E.; Gsottbauer, E.; Howarth, R. B.; Padilla, E.; Roca, J.; Schmidt, R.: “Parallel tracks towards a 
global treaty on carbon pricing” 
2018/13, Ayllón, S.; Nollenberger, N.: “The unequal opportunity for skills acquisition during the Great Recession in 
Europe” 
2018/14, Firmino, J.: “Class composition effects and school welfare: evidence from Portugal using panel data” 
2018/15, Durán-Cabré, J. M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.; Salvadori, L.: “La brecha fiscal: estudio y 




IEB Working Papers  
2018/16, Montolio, D.; Tur-Prats, A.: “Long-lasting social capital and its impact on economic development: the legacy 
of the commons” 
2018/17, Garcia-López, M. À.; Moreno-Monroy, A. I.: “Income segregation in monocentric and polycentric cities: does 
urban form really matter?” 
2018/18, Di Cosmo, V.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “From forward to spot prices: producers, retailers and loss averse consumers 
in electricity markets” 
2018/19, Brachowicz Quintanilla, N.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Is changing the minimum legal drinking age an effective 
policy tool?” 
2018/20, Nerea Gómez-Fernández, Mauro Mediavilla: “Do information and communication technologies (ICT) 
improve educational outcomes? Evidence for Spain in PISA 2015” 
2018/21, Montolio, D.; Taberner, P. A.: “Gender differences under test pressure and their impact on academic 
performance: a quasi-experimental design” 
2018/22, Rice, C.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Hit where it hurts – healthcare access and intimate partner violence” 
2018/23, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: “Wage differentials by bargaining regime in Spain (2002-2014). An 





2019/1, Mediavilla, M.; Mancebón, M. J.; Gómez-Sancho, J. M.; Pires Jiménez, L.: “Bilingual education and school 
choice: a case study of public secondary schools in the Spanish region of Madrid” 
2019/2, Brutti, Z.; Montolio, D.: “Preventing criminal minds: early education access and adult offending behavior” 
2019/3, Montalvo, J. G.; Piolatto, A.; Raya, J.: “Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market” 
2019/4, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.: “Behavioural responses to the re)introduction of 
wealth taxes. Evidence from Spain” 
2019/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Martínez Mazza, R.; Segú, M.: “Do short-term rental platforms 
affect housing markets? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona” 
2019/6, Domínguez, M.; Montolio, D.: “Bolstering community ties as a means of reducing crime” 
2019/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Massa-Camps, X.: “Why firms invest (or not) in energy efficiency? A review of the 
econometric evidence” 
2019/8, Gómez-Fernández, N.; Mediavilla, M.: “What are the factors that influence the use of ICT in the classroom by 
teachers? Evidence from a census survey in Madrid” 
2019/9, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “The long-run redistributive power of the net 
wealth tax” 
2019/10, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Building(s and) cities: delineating urban areas 
with a machine learning algorithm” 






2020/01, Daniele, G.; Piolatto, A.; Sas, W.: “Does the winner take it all? Redistributive policies and political 
extremism” 
2020/02, Sanz, C.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Betrayed by the elites: how corruption amplifies the political 
effects of recessions” 
2020/03, Farré, L.; Jofre-Monseny; J., Torrecillas, J.: “Commuting time and the gender gap in labor market 
participation” 
2020/04, Romarri, A.: “Does the internet change attitudes towards immigrants? Evidence from Spain” 
2020/05, Magontier, P.: “Does media coverage affect governments’preparation for natural disasters?” 
2020/06, McDougal, T.L.; Montolio, D.; Brauer, J.: “Modeling the U.S. firearms market: the effects of civilian stocks, 
crime, legislation, and armed conflict” 
2020/07, Veneri, P.; Comandon, A.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Daams, M.N.: “What do divided cities have in common? An 
international comparison of income segregation” 
2020/08, Piolatto, A.: “'Information doesn't want to be free': informational shocks with anonymous online platforms” 




IEB Working Papers  
2020/10, Montolio, D.; Oliveira, C.: “Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical 
evidence from Rio de Janeiro” 
2020/11, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Congestion in highways when tolls and railroads 
matter: evidence from European cities” 
2020/12, Ferraresi, M.; Mazzanti, M.; Mazzarano, M.; Rizzo, L.; Secomandi, R.: “Political cycles and yardstick 
competition in the recycling of waste. evidence from Italian provinces” 
2020/13, Beigelman, M.; Vall Castelló, J.: “COVID-19 and help-seeking behavior for intimate partner violence victims” 
2020/14, Martínez-Mazza, R.: “Mom, Dad: I’m staying” initial labor market conditions, housing markets, and welfare” 
2020/15, Agrawal, D.; Foremny, D.; Martínez-Toledano, C.: “Paraísos fiscales, wealth taxation, and mobility” 
2020/16, Garcia-Pérez, J.I.; Serrano-Alarcón, M.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Long-term unemployment subsidies and middle-





2021/01, Rusteholz, G.; Mediavilla, M.; Pires, L.: “Impact of bullying on academic performance. A case study for the 
community of Madrid” 
2021/02, Amuedo-Dorantes, C.; Rivera-Garrido, N.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Reforming the provision of cross-border 
medical care evidence from Spain” 
2021/03, Domínguez, M.: “Sweeping up gangs: The effects of tough-on-crime policies from a network approach” 
 
Public Policies 
 
ieb@ub.edu 
www.ieb.edu 
